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1. Dedication
Noyes Leech retires from the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School after 37 years as a distinguished scholar, superb teacher, and invaluable
colleague. It is particularly fitting that the student editors of the Journal
decided to dedicate this issue to Professor Leech because he is one of the
founders of the Journal and of the International Faculty for Corporate and
Capital Market Law, whose work provided the foundation upon which the
Journal was built.
The International Faculty, a distinguished group primarily of academics
from nine countries, was created as a response to the rapid internationaliza-
tion of the capital markets. Professor Leech thought it desirable to establish a
living resource to accumulate and make available, on a timely basis, knowl-
edge and expertise relevant to the major participants in the developing
international financial markets.
The concept of the International Faculty attracted Professor Leech, because
it allowed common issues to be pursued in a particularized and practical
fashion. Loose, general statements annoy Professor Leech. In the setting of the
International Faculty, statements could be pursued in detail until the relevant
insight was cleanly articulated. The process of questioning allowed all who
participated in the discussion to understand precisely the extent to which, for
example, our Swiss colleague, Alain Hirsch, might object to the notion of
required disclosure of financial information about a publicly held company
and the circumstances in the Swiss experience which accounted for his
objections.
The discussion which constitutes this article reflects Professor Leech's
approach to teaching. A comparative analysis of Japanese, German, and
• Professor of Law, J. Wolfgang Goethe Universitat.
• Dean and University Professor of Law and Finance. University of Pennsylvania.
• Partner, Skadden, Arps. Slate. Meagher & Flom.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
F. Kuebler et al. / Corporate Governance
American law, as it relates to certain aspects of corporate governance, is
developed by forcing a lawyer familiar with each system to address common,
concrete hypotheticals. By requiring specific answers and supporting explana-
tions, similarities and differences in the system emerge with clarity. If there
were more hypotheticals and someone to probe the soft spots in the answers
initially presented, we would have a pretty good picture of how Professor
Leech likes to teach a course and we would also understand why we at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School regard him as one of our greatest
teachers.
2. Introduction
This panel will deal with corporate governance [1]. This notion refers to the
distribution of decision-making powers in large enterprises. The basic problem
is that those who make these decisions should make them not only and not
-even primarily for themselves but also for other people. Therefore, it can be
generally assumed that we are all, from whatever legal system we come,
interested in having some mechanisms that insure the accountability of corpo-
rate decision making.
How we view these mechanisms and what we expect from them may
depend very much on how we view the big enterprise:
* We could perceive it as an organization which is primarily determined by
market forces. This organization may in some points not work as effec-
tively as we wish. We therefore could have legal rules in order to improve
economic efficiency;
* We could also see the enterprise as a social and political institution
having an impact not only on markets but also on social structures like
the political process and behavioral attitudes (the way people think and
act). We therefore may want legal rules in order to fit the enterprise into
the patterns of our society. It is obvious that this means a different
function of law.
Our discussion should explore how important legal systems actually deal
with these issues.
3. Background on German Law
Professor Kuebler:
Let me summarize some of the aspects of German corporate law in three
points.
My first point deals with statistics. In Germany, there are only about 2,000
stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften, AG) [2] compared to close to 300,000
limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschraenkter Haftung, GmbH)
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[3]. The transfer of shares in a GmbH requires a contract concluded before a
notary public [4]; therefore, the GmbH can only be used as a closed corpora-
tion. However, many medium-sized and even some large enterprises are still
run in the legal form of a limited partnership [5].
There are only about 450 corporations listed on one of the stock exchanges
and there is no over-the-counter market. For about sixty years - from the
beginning of the First World War to the mid-1970s - virtually no business has
gone public. There have been some changes during the last few years: for
example, companies like Springer (the largest newspaper publisher), Nixdorf
(a fast-growing computer producer), and Porsche (until recently the last
privately-owned car company) are now listed on the stock exchange.
Among the 450 companies listed on a stock exchange, there are many which
are controlled by individuals, families or other enterprises. Thus, there is a
very small number of truly public corporations, maybe twenty or twenty-five
(the number depends somewhat on the definition given to the notion of a
"public' corporation). These corporations are the big names in German
business, such as Deutsche Bank, Allianz, Daimler-Benz, and Bayer. Thus, the
public corporations are a small community in a comparatively small country;
the scenario is quite different from that in the U.S.
My second point relates to law. German law requires a mandatory two-tier
board system for stock corporations; there has to be a management board
(Vorstand) as well as a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) [6].
The managing board actually runs the business; it represents the corpora-
tion in all transactions and decides its day-to-day activities. The members of
the managing board are appointed by the supervisory board for a maximum of
five years and the appointment can be renewed [7]. That, of course, happens in
most cases.
The supervisory board was originally designed as a strict institutionaliza-
tion of the independent or outside director; all its members were elected by
the shareholders in the annual meeting. Today this is true only for one-half of
the members. The other half is elected by the employees of the enterprise [8].
This practice is the key element of the German system of worker codetermina-
tion. It began more than sixty years ago and since then four codetermination
laws have been enacted [9]. It can have an important impact on corporate
decision making as well as on labor relations.
My third point is that the German stock corporation is normally not
involved in litigation, and this is particularly true of the big public corpora-
tions. There are only a few cases and that means that there is not much law.
Apart from the small number of stock corporations, there are two reasons for
this lack of activity: first, there is virtually no derivative suit, i.e., a single
shareholder cannot sue the managing board on behalf of the corporation;
secondly, there is no contingency fee and thus no incentive for lawyers to seek
conflicts and commence litigation.
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4. Background on Japanese Law
4.1. Basic Structure of the Japanese Legal System
Mr. Shapiro:
The present structure of the Japanese legal system has evolved over the past
100 years. It represents a unique case of a voluntary importation of a group of
foreign legal institutions superimposed on an indigenous cultural base.
Japan is basically a Civil Code country rather than a country whose legal
system is based on common law. In the early years after the Meiji Restoration
in 1868 [10], it came under the French influence. As a result, the Civil Code of
1890 and the Penal Code of 1882 were French imports [11]. The French phase
ended and the German phase began just before the turn of the century [12].
Thereafter, the German influence predominated until after World War I [13],
during which the Japanese were on the side of the Allies and fought against
Germany.
In between the two World Wars, the Anglo-American influence pre-
dominated, resulting in the importation of Anglo-American trust law into
Japan [14]. During the 1930s and 1940s, Japan turned inward and sought to
rely more on its own indigenous, cultural institutions and sought to impose a
Japanese national character on the legal system [15].
After World War II, with the total destruction of Japan and the occupation
by the United States for a period of seven years, the legal system underwent
extensive changes influenced by the American occupiers [16]. This was espe-
cially true in the corporate and tax fields as well as in the antitrust and
securities fields [17].
The Japanese courts are divided into the familiar three-tier structure of
district courts, intermediate appellate courts, and a Supreme Court composed
of fifteen justices [18]. While Japan experimented with the jury system in
criminal cases between. 1923 and 1943 [19], juries have not been used tradition-
ally and are not used today.
Cases have precedential value and this is not totally unfamiliar to the
Japanese mind, inasmuch as during the 250-year period before the Restoration
of 1868, judicially-made law played an important part in the Japanese legal
system [20].
Japan has had two written constitutions in modem times: the first, modeled
after the German Constitution, was promulgated in 1889 (Meiji Constitution);
the second, an American draft, was promulgated in 1946 under the U.S.
Occupation (Showa Constitution) [21.] There are those in Japan who believe it
is time for the Japanese to draft their own charter.
4.2. The Japanese Legal Profession
The Japanese Bar is essentially a barrister's bar. In creating the new
profession of bengoshi (counsel) [22], the Japanese used the English barrister
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and the French avocat (advocate) as their model. The first bar associations
were formed in 1880 [23] and the first law regulating the profession was
adopted in 1893 [241. Japanese barristers are educated on the European model,
i.e., law faculties are departments in undergraduate universities. After four
years in a faculty of law, a person wishing to be a judge, a prosecutor (only
approximately one percent do so) [25], or a barrister has to pass the national
bar examination and then receive special training at the Legal Training and
Research Institute for two years [26]. Thus, the Japanese Bar has been kept
artificially small.
4.3. Japanese Attitudes Toward Law
The Japanese, like the Chinese, dislike abstract principles. They believe law
is primarily an expedient to satisfy human needs, which is an attitude
inherited from the Confucian tradition [27]. Law is regarded as a nuisance to
be avoided, if possible [28]. In this connection, formalism should not be
confused with legalism; while the Japanese are formalists, they are not
legalists. Therefore, it is important to understand that the behavioral answer
and the legal answer may be different, i.e., the culture and psychology may
dictate one mode of behavior while the law suggests another.
5. Panel Discussion
5.1. Hypothetical Number One
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Alpha, a large publicly held corpora-
tion, is an alumnus of Epsilon University. Alpha's executive offices and
manufacturing sites are located far away from Epsilon. Epsilon asks Alpha for
a contribution of $100,000 to the endowment for its library.
Would it be legally proper for Alpha to make the contribution? Is it likely
that Alpha would make the contribution?
5.1.1. Dean Mundheim's Response
The relevant U.S. law for answering this hypothetical can be found in the
statutes and decisions of the state in which Alpha is domiciled. Although state
corporation laws generally view the business corporation as having the objec-
tive of conducting its business with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain, these laws increasingly recognize that even where corporate
profit and shareholder gain are not enhanced, the corporation may properly
expend "a reasonable amount of resources [for] public welfare, humanitarian,
educational and philanthropic purposes" [29]. This development reflects the
American desire to see diversity and decentralization in the pursuit of educa-
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tional and philanthropic activity. It would be difficult to achieve the goals of
diversity and decentralization without encouraging corporate generosity.
A gift by Alpha to the library at Epsilon University might even be sustained
under the more traditional view that corporations may only act in a way which
enhances shareholder economic interests. For example, in a well known case,
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow [30], the New Jersey Supreme Court
was asked to examine the propriety of a corporate contribution to Princeton
University's annual giving campaign. The court sustained the gift. It found
that the corporation benefited at least indirectly from making the gift because
free, non-governmental educational institutions are essential in fostering an
economic and social environment suitable for private business enterprise. Such
a broad articulation of the benefits standard appears to allow a broad variety
of corporate contributions to pass judicial muster as an appropriate object of
corporate concern.
Alpha will probably be limited to holding its contribution to Epsilon to a
reasonable amount [31]. Although there are no firm bench marks to measure a
reasonable amount [32], one guideline would be the ten percent of taxable
income which a corporation may deduct for federal income tax purposes [33].
In fact, total charitable giving for corporations in the U.S. tends to be closer to
one percent than ten percent of taxable income [34].
The last part of the hypothetical asks whether it is likely that Alpha would
make the contribution. Corporations are major supporters of universities in
the United States [35]. The interest of Alpha's CEO should be very helpful in
securing the contribution for Epsilon. However, there is a disposition to link
corporate contributions to institutions and projects which have some relation-
ship to the interest of the corporation, its employees or other important
constituencies.
5.1.2. Professor Kuebler's Response
A situation like the one presented in the first hypothetical has - as far as I
can see - never been an issue before any German court. This can be explained
by two factors.
First, German law provides a very broad definition of the objectives of the
corporation. This idea goes back into the early history of industrialization in
the nineteenth century. The industrial revolution generated a working class
which was not only materially disadvantaged but also excluded from the rapid
progress of civilization. In order to reintegrate the "proletarians" into society,
liberal theorists like Robert von Mohl and Lorenz von Stein taught that
enterprises should be organized as cooperatives, giving voting rights and profit
shares not only to investors but also to workers. In the 1920s, it became
accepted by an important part of corporate management. The most important
spokesman of this group was Walter Rathenau, the CEO of Allgemeine
Elektrizitaets-GeseUschaft (AEG), the then major electrical company [36].
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Corporate management conceived the enterprise as an institution for which
the workers were as important as the investors.
In 1937, this view became enacted as Section 70 of the new stock corpora-
tion law [37]. This provision stated that "[t]he managing board is, on its own
responsibility, to manage the corporation as the good of the enterprise and its
retinue and the common weal of folk and realm demand" [38). This language
appeared inappropriate after 1945 so the clause was eliminated when the stock
corporation law was reformed in 1965 [39]. The official explanation of the new
statute, however, explicitly states that no change in the law was intended; the
provision was dropped as the rule appeared evident. Today the social responsi-
bility of the business corporation is based not only on the co-determination
statutes [40] but also on the constitutional provision stating that property
should be used not only in the private but also in the public interest [41].
In specifying this obligation, the courts use the notion of the "enterprise
interest" [42]. It is generally assumed that it includes the interest of share-
holders, creditors, employees, the local community and the public at large. It is
obvious that this notion gives a lot of leeway to management. It would thus be
very difficult to attack a contribution to a university in court.
Secondly, at the same time, German public corporations are reluctant to
make such a contribution. Fund-raising in Germany is a hard job, much
harder than in the U.S. or in Japan. All universities are State universities.
Therefore, the corporations assume that higher education is the responsibility
of the government and that the taxes they pay are enough of a contribution.
This is not to say that German corporations make no donations at all.
There are basically three common types of donations.
One type is for specific purposes closely related to business. For example.
the chemical industry gives money for chemical research in universities.
Another type of donation is for specific events mostly those taking place in the
local community, such as a concert, a sports event, a symposium or an
exposition. In general, no large sums are involved. These donations are not
based exclusively on public relations motives or the intention to be a "good
citizen"; there is a co-determination factor, i.e., all or most of the employees
live in the local community which benefits from the contributions. In addition,
there are political donations. They involve many problems which are outside
the scope of this article.
Finally, one procedural aspect would be mentioned. The big corporations in
general adopt policies which are approved by the supervisory board. Within
these policy parameters, the decisions will be made by the managing board.
Any other donation will have to be approved by the supervisory board.
Whenever more than a small sum is involved, it will not be an individual but a
collective decision.
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5.1.3. Mr. Shapiro's Response
Based on the facts it would be legally proper for Alpha to make the
contribution; it would not be ultra vires. In fact, in a decided case relating to
political donations, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that a corporation may
act in a manner which it considers to be socially responsible and of only
indirect economic benefit.
It is also likely that Alpha would voluntarily make the contribution. The
fact that the university is distant is not really relevant because the company
may recruit employees at that university. It is not at all unusual for such gifts
to be made by Japanese companies and, subject to a limitation based on a
complicated formula, the contribution would be deductible for tax purposes
[43].
Parenthetically, it should be noted that while philanthropy does not exist in
Japan on the scale it does in the United States, nevertheless there are about
16,000 charitable corporations or trusts of which about 2,500 are national. A
substantial number of these are corporate foundations to which contributions
are systemically made by the corporations.
5.2. Hypothetical Number Two
Alpha is interested in purchasing a piece of land adjacent to its present
property. The Chief Executive Officer of the company has undertaken the
negotiation personally. He discovers that the land which the company wishes
to acquire can only be purchased as part of a larger parcel which its owner is
willing to sell for $6 million. The portion in which the company is interested
comprises roughly two-thirds of the entire parcel. The president asks an
independent appraiser to value the portion of the property in which the
company is interested. The appraiser indicates that a value of $4.5 to $5
million would be a fair price. He also appears to view the other one-third of
the land as of roughly the same value as the portion in which the corporation
is interested.
The CEO proposes that the company buy the property in which it has
indicated an interest for $4.5 million and that he and a group of colleagues
together buy the balance of the parcel for $1.5 million.
Since the company's development of the land will likely increase the value
of the surrounding property, the CEO also proposes to buy up surrounding
property before news of the company's plans become publicly known.
What are the responsibilities of the General Counsel or any other institu-
tion or person inside the company when she learns about these proposed
transactions?
5.2.1. Dean Mundheim's Response
This hypothetical deals with the duty of loyalty. Corporations provide a
vehicle for aggregating wealth over indefinite periods of time. Since corpora-
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tions tend to be managed by people other than the dominant investors, there is
a need to insure the loyalty of the managers, to insure that the investor in the
corporation will be faithfully served.
In this hypothetical, the president and his group receive an opportunity to
buy land (the additional one-third parcel) at what appears to be a bargain
price. Since the president is aware that the corporation is interested in buying
land in the area in which the additional parcel is located, he has an obligation
to present to the corporation the opportunity to make the favorable purchase.
The president can take advantage of the opportunity only if the corporation
has properly rejected it after all the facts have been disclosed to the corpora-
tion [44].
The opportunity can only be properly rejected by corporate decision-makers
at a level of the president or higher who are not financially interested in the
transaction [45]. In this case, the relevant decision-makers will be those
members of the board of directors who are not part of the purchasing group
and not officers subordinate to the president. Publicly held corporations in the
U.S. usually have a substantial number of non-management directors on the
board. The role of these non-management or outside directors is to monitor
the activities of management [46]. One monitoring role will be to review
transactions in which management has a conflict of interest and to assure that
the conflict will be resolved favorably to the corporation.
When all the facts are presented to the directors they will have an
opportunity to determine whether the corporation should buy the additional
one-third of the parcel and also to determine whether the $4.5 million price for
the other two-thirds of the parcel is fair to the corporation.
The second part of the hypothetical deals with the use of confidential
corporate information for the personal benefit of the president. Although the
law is not crystal clear [47], I think that the modem trend in U.S. corporate
law would view the president's use of this information as a breach of his duty
of loyalty even though it appears that the corporation will not be harmed as a
consequence of purchases of land adjoining the parcel to be acquired by the
corporation. If the president (or his group) make these purchases without
appropriate corporate consent, the corporation could sue to recover any
profits made as a consequence of the land purchases.
A particularly interesting point under American practice is raised by the
question of the responsibility of the general counsel of the corporation when
she learns the facts. The general counsel must advise the president that he
must make full disclosure of the material facts relating to these proposed
transactions to the board of directors. As I indicated previously, failure to
disclose would result in a breach of the president's duty of loyalty to the
corporation.
Suppose, however, the president says: "Thank you, Ms. General Counsel,
for your advice. However, I do not believe that this item must be brought
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
F. Kuebler et al. / Corporate Governance
before the Board and I do not plan to put it on the agenda." Indeed, the
president does not even invite the general counsel to attend the board meeting.
Must the general counsel take any action? The American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility strongly suggests that she must
[48]. Under the Rules, the general counsel's client is the corporation [49]. In a
case in which an officer of the corporation is prepared to take an action or
abstain from an action in breach of a duty to the corporation that could result
in substantial harm to the corporation, the Rules state that the "lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization"
[50]. Here it seems to me that the general counsel, having failed to get the
president to reconsider his action or to inform the board, is herself obligated
to inform the board because it is the next highest authority in the corporation
and can be expected to act in the interest of the corporation. I think that
obligation is quite clear with respect to the first part of the hypothetical,
because there is a potential for substantial injury to the corporation (overpay-
ment on the two-thirds parcel). In the second part of the hypothetical, the
obligation is less clear because there is no potential for substantial injury to
the corporation. However, as a practical matter I think the general counsel
would feel obligated to go to the board on this issue, too. If members of the
board discover that the general counsel knew the facts but did not report
them, they will feel betrayed.
My point is that under developing American law, the general counsel of the.
corporation has a policing function and the Rules underscore that function. I
do not minimize the extreme discomfort felt by the lawyer who finds that she
must go over the head of the person with whom she normally deals to fulfill
her obligations to the corporation. As a consequence, the general counsel will
undoubtedly be very forceful in her representations to the president about the
adverse consequences to him if he does not report the transactions to the
board.
I should also point out that if the corporation is publicly held, there may be
disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws relating to these trans-
actions [51]. Because the general counsel will likely be involved in making
those disclosures, there will be additional incentives for her to persuade the
president not to breach his duty of loyalty to the corporation [52].
5.2.2. Professor Kuebler's Response
This hypothetical invites some general observations, but I should first state
very briefly that the general counsel is not a clearly defined position under
German law. There is no rule and not even doctrine imposing a special
responsibility. The function can be performed by a member of the managing
board together with other tasks such as employment relations. But it can also
be carried out at the third level of the corporate hierarchy.
There are only a few cases on the issue; nearly all of them concern the small
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limited liability company and not the big public corporations [53]. German
law, therefore, does not have a developed and sophisticated doctrine of
corporate opportunities. I would hold management liable for both transactions
in the hypothetical, and I hope that the German courts would apply standards
comparable to those of American law. But there are recent (unpublished)
lower court decisions endorsing a much more lenient approach [541.
For the big public corporation, the legal answer to our hypothetical would
be found in the employment contracts of top managers [55]. They normally
have to accept the obligation to report all their private investment transactions
to the Chairman of the supervisory board. In some cases they even may have
to ask for a consent before they are allowed to enter into negotiations [56].
Is it conceivable that a transaction will not be reported? At least in a case
like our hypothetical, this is unlikely. This is to be explained by important
structural elements of the German system. Apart from the representatives of
the employees, most members of the supervisory board of a big public
corporation are members of the management boards of other big public
corporations [57]. There are proportionately many more interlocking directors
in Germany than in the U.S. An observer from abroad has referred to the
Aufsichtsrat as a "device for systematic consultation between businesses
whose interests are intertwined" [58].
There is a strong common interest of top management in big corporations
not to rock the boat by scandals or other undesirable events. Such events may
shake investor confidence, trigger legislation or provoke new co determination
requests from the unions. For this reason, there are unwritten standards the
violation of which may result in a broad range of sanctions. The mild penalty
might be that the manager will never be promoted to Chairman nor offered a
position on the supervisory board of other corporations. The severe penalty is
removal. As long as the precipitating event has not been publicized, the
sanction will be disguised as a resignation for reasons of bad health or
important differences of opinion, much to the regret of the corporation.
5.2.3. Mr. Shapiro's Response
The CEO would be liable because the company was damaged based upon
the loss of a clear opportunity to make a profit. Either the shareholders or the
Board could take action to enforce this liability, from which the CEO could
only be released by unanimous approval of all the shareholders [59]. In Japan,
the same corporate opportunity doctrine exists as in the U.S. [60].
The practical answer would be for the CEO to suggest that the company
buy all of the property and sell off the land which is not needed.
As to the surrounding property, there would appear to be no legal imped-
iment to the CEO's purchase of this property, even though the news of the
company's plans is not publicly known.
In Japanese corporations, it would not be the general counsel who would
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have responsibility to act but the statutory auditor, who is elected by the
shareholders and who has the responsibility to intervene in such a case [61].
The statutory auditor has the right to and does attend meetings of the board
of directors [62] and is legally independent, although usually an employee of
the company.
5.3. Hypothetical Number Three
Beginning roughly two years ago, Alpha's performance has substantially
deteriorated. Although the stock market has risen thirty percent over that
period, the price of Alpha stock has fallen twenty-five percent. Its earnings
have slipped from $5.00 a share to $2.20 a share. Part of Alpha's problem
appears to be failure of the market for its major products to expand. However,
Alpha's share of the market for these products has declined from fifteen
percent to twelve percent in the last two years. There are mounting complaints
that delivery of its products is slow and that its response to complaints is often
non-existent. In addition, Alpha's CEO has been arrested twice in the last six
months for drunken driving, and there are rumors that he has a drinking
problem.
Does anyone have a legal responsibility to take steps at this point? If no
legal responsibilities compel action, what kind of action, if any, would you
expect to be taken at this point?
5.3.1. Dean Mundheirn's Response
Under American law, the corporation is managed by its senior executives
under the supervision of a board of directors [63]. This supervision must meet
a standard of due care [64] and failure to meet that standard would subject the
directors to civil liability for any harm suffered by the corporation [651.
However, even if the directors make a wrong decision, American courts are
not inclined to second guess their business judgment if it is made in good faith
[66]. Courts expect that the directors will take steps adequately to inform
themselves about the subject with respect to which they are making a business
decision [67].
Applying these general statements of the law to this situation, I expect the
directors to make inquiry about the reason for the decline in corporate
performance. I expect the drunken driving arrests and the rumors of the
CEO's drinking to trigger further inquiry into his fitness to continue in his job.
It would be likely that, under the circumstances of this hypothetical, the
directors would act to remove the chief executive officer or to force other
changes. If after making inquiry, however, the directors choose to accept the
variety of explanations which will undoubtedly be given for the corporation's
declining fortunes and decide not to take any further action, I doubt that the
directors would be legally accountable even if the company's fortune continues
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to decline. However, the ever present threat of suit may influence the directors'
response to the corporation's misfortunes.
In addition to the board of directors, it is likely that the long-term creditors
of the corporation would take a particular interest in the poor performance of
the corporation. The creditors might talk to particular members of the board
and make their unhappiness known. If covenants in the loan agreements or in
the trust indenture are violated, the creditors will have the option of exercising
remedies under these agreements. The creditors will, however, be careful not to
appear to be seeking control of the corporation because with control come
certain responsibilities that the creditors probably would not want to assume.
The fall in the stock price of the corporation and the information made
public because of the obligation to make full and accurate disclosure con-
cerning the company's financial health may serve as an invitation to a bid
from another enterprise or individual who believes that he can operate Alpha's
business more effectively. This technique, known as a hostile tender offer, has
become a common American response to a poorly managed enterprise [68].
5.3.2. Professor Kuebler's Response
Diminished corporate performance is probably the case most likely to
occur. With regard to drunken driving as the causative factor, all members of
managing boards have their personal driver and are very much encouraged to
use them for all social events in which alcohol will be consumed. An arrest
would trigger enormous pressure from the other members of the managing
board and the supervisory board to resign. The same would probably be true
once a drinking problem has been leaked to the public. If the CEO would not
agree to step down, he could be removed by the supervisory board [69]. Under
German law, cause has to be shown, but the removal is effective until the
courts have definitely established that there was no cause [70].
In the case that the corporate performance deteriorates, the formal respon-
sibility resides in the supervisory board [71]. Its response would not be
dictated by legal considerations to the same extent as it may be in the U.S. In
fact, the timing and the form of the intervention will be at the discretion of the
chairman of the supervisory board; both his personality and, more signifi-
cantly his role in the corporation will guide his action. There are two models
which should be distinguished:
(1) In many of the manufacturing corporations, the Chairman of the
supervisory board is the CEO of another corporation, possibly a bank.
The amount of time he is able to spend for his monitoring task will be
limited. At the same time he may be reluctant to interfere with manage-
ment too early. This may be particularly true for a bank because such
interference could discourage other corporations from offering similar
positions of influence. Thus, the intervention may come comparatively
late. That was true for AEG: significant changes in management oc-
curred only after the crisis became obvious.
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(2) The Chairman of the supervisory board of a bank is generally the
former Chairman of the managing board. In his new function he has an
office in the bank, a secretary, a driver, one or even several assistants.
He will go to his office every day and look into everything he thinks is
important. When the managing board of Commerz-Bank had made
some problematic decisions, the Chairman of the supervisory board
immediately sought a majority vote to remove the Chairman and two
members of the managing board. Under a special provision of the
German statute, [72] he then took over the function of the CEO for half
of a year. After this interval, he hired a new Chairman of the managing
board and thus was able to return to his former position. The bank was
able to solve its difficulties without requesting any outside help.
In both cases it seems that neither shareholders nor creditors played an
important role. Germany has not experienced any hostile takeover during the
last 50 years; in this respect there is nothing of which management should be
afraid. The important creditors would normally be secured. However, this may
be different for the "Hausbank", the bank with which the corporation is doing
most of its business. This bank will normally be represented on the supervisory
board; thus its action would probably start within that body.
Both cases indicate that there may be some impact of co-determination.
After AEG had gone into receivership, a British company expressed an
interest in acquiring the enterprise. When the negotiations failed, it was
attributed to the British company's extreme dislike of the behavior of a union
representative on the supervisory board. The unions have refuted that version
and indicated that there were compelling reasons to discourage the acquisition.
In the case of Commerz-Bank, the stepping down of the Chairman from the
supervisory to the managing board would have given the representatives of the
employees the majority in the supervisory board. When the measure was
discussed, their spokesperson offered that one of their members would always
abstain either from attending or from voting and thus reestablish the balance.
This offer was accepted and the rescue took place.
5.3.3. Mr Shapiro's Response
Assuming there has been no illegality, the statutory auditor should report
the problem at a board meeting or shareholder meeting [73], since the Board of
Directors has the responsibility to oversee and can remove a CEO [74]. Only
the shareholders can remove a director [751. In practice, it would be the
creditors of Alpha who would exert pressure to have the CEO removed.
As a practical matter, it would be extremely rare for a CEO of a major
company to be driving his own car, much less under the influence of alcohol.
Japanese laws on drunken driving are extremely strict and spot checks are
frequent. As a result, a CEO generally has a car and driver at his disposal even
for social occasions.
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In an analogous situation involving the Mitsukoshi department store, the
CEO was removed after the company experienced financial difficulties when it
was learned that he had been giving business to a company headed by his
mistress. In a rare display of formal Board disapproval, the CEO was removed
by a vote of the directors, something which would not normally be necessary
in Japan where voluntary resignations under such circumstances are much
more the norm.
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